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Abstract 
Research on linguistic biases shows that stereotypic expectancies are implicitly reflected in 
language and thereby subtly communicated to message recipients. We examined whether 
these findings extend to the use of negations (e.g., not smart instead of stupid). We 
hypothesized that people use more negations in descriptions of stereotype inconsistent 
behavior than in descriptions of stereotype consistent behavior. In three studies, participants 
either judged the applicability of experimentally controlled person descriptions, or 
spontaneously produced person descriptions themselves. Results provided support for this 
hypothesis. Moreover, a fourth study demonstrated that negations have communicative 
consequences. When a target person’s behavior was described with negations, message 
recipients inferred that this behavior was an exception to the rule, and that it was more likely 
caused by situational circumstances than by dispositional factors. These findings indicate that 
by using negations people implicitly communicate stereotypic expectancies, and that 
negations play a subtle but powerful role in stereotype maintenance. 
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The Negation Bias: 
When Negations Signal Stereotypic Expectancies 
When people describe others’ behaviors they can choose different words and formulations. 
For example, people can describe a person’s dim comment as Harry was stupid or Harry was 
not smart. Which description they choose seems arbitrary at first sight. Both sentences 
adequately describe the event and people do not seem to give their choice of words much 
thought. Yet, research shows that rather than being arbitrary, people’s choice of words and 
language use is driven by systematic and implicit social cognitive processes. For instance, 
research on linguistic biases shows that people’s prior expectancies and stereotypes influence 
their choice of words in describing others. That is, people use more abstract predicates to 
describe stereotype consistent behaviors than stereotype inconsistent behaviors. This biased 
language use not only reflects a speaker’s stereotypic expectancies about a person, but, 
importantly, also transmits these expectancies to recipients. In this way, biased language use 
is one of the predominant means of stereotype maintenance at an interpersonal level (Maass, 
1999; Maass, Salvi, Arcuri & Semin, 1989; Sekaquaptewa et al., 2003; Wigboldus, Semin & 
Spears, 2000).  
To extend our knowledge on linguistic biases, the present paper introduces the 
negation bias. Negation descriptions contain a negation marker such as not or no to deny the 
truth value of a particular proposition (e.g., Harry was not smart). We will refer to 
descriptions of others’ behavior that include such negation markers as negations. Conversely, 
affirmation descriptions assert the truth value of a particular proposition and may be used to 
describe the same behavioral event (e.g., Harry was stupid). In the present research, we 
investigate whether the use of negations is influenced by people’s stereotypic expectancies 
and whether negations are thereby able to transmit stereotypes between people. We suggest 
that people tend to use more negations when they describe stereotype inconsistent information 
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than when they describe stereotype consistent information. For example, people may be 
inclined to say Harry was not smart, when Harry’s dim comment is stereotype inconsistent 
with the social category to which Harry belongs (e.g., Harry is a professor). Conversely, they 
may be more inclined to say Harry was stupid when the behavior is stereotype consistent with 
the social category (e.g., Harry is a soccer hooligan). Moreover, we expected that this biased 
use of negations and affirmations results in stereotype confirming inferences among recipients 
of these communications, thereby contributing to stereotype maintenance at the interpersonal 
level. 
In the following, we first review prior research on linguistic biases. Next, we examine 
existing knowledge about negations from pragmatics and psycholinguistics. Subsequently, we 
unfold further our argument about the occurrence and consequences of a negation bias.  
Linguistic Biases 
Research on linguistic biases shows that the words used to describe others’ behaviors 
subtly reflect people’s stereotypic expectancies about others. People systematically vary their 
language use in communications about stereotype inconsistent and stereotype consistent 
information. The linguistic intergroup and expectancy bias, for example, shows that people 
tend to use more concrete, descriptive language when describing behavior that violates 
stereotypic expectancies, whereas they use more abstract language when the same behavior is 
consistent with stereotypic expectancies (i.e., Maass et al., 1989; Wigboldus et al., 2000). 
Thus, when describing a man demonstrating behavior which is inconsistent with the male 
stereotype (e.g., crying), people use relatively concrete language (e.g., he has tears in his 
eyes). In contrast, when describing a woman demonstrating the same behavior, people tend to 
use more abstract language to describe this stereotype consistent event (e.g., she is emotional; 
Wigboldus et al., 2000). Similarly, the stereotypic explanatory bias shows that descriptions of 
stereotype inconsistent behavior tend to contain more explanations aimed at clarifying the 
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apparent inconsistency than descriptions of stereotype consistent behavior (Sekaquaptewa et 
al., 2003). Underlining the powerful role these linguistic biases play in stereotype 
maintenance, research shows that they operate outside of people’s awareness and are related 
to implicit measures of prejudice (e.g., von Hippel, Sekaquaptewa, & Vargas, 1997).  
The significance of these linguistic biases in descriptions of others lies in the fact that 
they implicitly communicate stereotypes to message recipients. The linguistic intergroup and 
expectancy bias, for example, causes recipients to draw inferences from descriptions that are 
consistent with the stereotypic expectancies of the communicator (Maass et al., 1989; 
Wigboldus et al., 2000). The relatively concrete language use in stereotype inconsistent 
messages causes recipients to infer that the behavior is unexpected, is an exception to the rule, 
and that it is more likely caused by situational circumstances than by dispositional factors. In 
contrast, the more abstract language use in stereotype consistent messages implies that the 
behavior is expected and that it is more likely caused by the actor’s dispositional 
characteristics than by situational circumstances. Thus, by means of subtle variations in 
language abstraction use, people implicitly transmit their stereotypic expectancies to 
recipients, with the effect that the stereotype is shared and maintained interpersonally (Franco 
& Maass, 1996; Wigboldus et al. 2000). 
Existing research on linguistic biases reflecting stereotypic expectancies has not 
addressed the role of negations. In the current paper we aim to fill this gap and introduce the 
negation bias. The negation bias is conceptualized as people’s tendency to use negations 
when communicating stereotype inconsistent information about others. Specifically, we 
expect that people use more negations when they communicate stereotype inconsistent 
information than when they communicate stereotype consistent information. Moreover, we 
hypothesize that recipients are sensitive to this biased use of negations by communicators, in 
that they will make biased attributions based on this information. In this way, the negation 
 The negation bias  6
bias may contribute to the interpersonal maintenance and transmission of stereotypes. Our 
expectations are fueled by earlier work on negations that is described in following.  
Negations 
Philosophers, logicians, psychologists, and linguists have studied negations in 
language use extensively (for an overview see Horn, 1989). A central issue they aimed to 
explain is when and why people use a negation rather than an affirmation to communicate 
information. According to Jordan (1998) the commonly held view is that negations (e.g., not 
drunk) are equivalent in meaning to their semantic opposites (e.g., sober). Jordan, in contrast, 
argued that negations are different, in that negations are more likely to be used in denying 
something previously stated or implying the contrary. In a pragmatics study he provided 
illustrations from natural written and spoken language to back up this claim. For example, 
signs in public areas typically use negations to signal exceptions. To illustrate, a no-exit sign 
on a door acknowledges that people expect to be able to leave an area via any door. Similarly, 
a no-smoking sign is used when the expected norm is that smoking is generally allowed. This 
suggests that negations are meaningful in that they deny what people expect to be the general 
rule.  
The relation between expectations and negation use also follows from the use of 
expressions in communicating quantities (Moxey & Sanford, 2000). A statement like not 
many people go to the cinema implies that someone might have expected that many people 
would go to the cinema, and subsequently denies that this was the case. The negation not 
many suggests either that the speaker expected that many people would go, or that the speaker 
believed the listener expected that many people would go. Thus, one function of negations 
seems to be that they indicate something that is different, unusual, or contrary to an existing 
expectancy (Jordan, 1998). 
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Experimental studies into negations have focused mainly on how negated concepts are 
processed and comprehended rather than on when they are used. Importantly, also these 
studies suggest that negations are relatively more appropriate in communications about 
expectancy inconsistent information than expectancy consistent information. That is, 
sentences containing a negation typically take more time to process and comprehend than 
affirming sentences (Carpenter & Just, 1975; Clark & Chase, 1972; Gough, 1965; Deutsch, 
Gawronski, Strack, 2006). Interestingly, however, this difference in processing time seems to 
disappear when negations are used in an appropriate context (Glenberg, Robertson, Jansen & 
Johnson-Glenberg, 1999; Wason, 1965). One appropriate context (a so called context of 
plausible denial; Wason, 1965) is one in which an expectation needs to be denied or to be 
noted. For example, the negation the train was not late this morning is more plausible when 
the train is normally late than when it is normally punctual. Thus, negations seem to be more 
plausible, and thereby more easy to process and comprehend, in contexts in which they denote 
information that is inconsistent with people’s expectations. 
Further support for this assumption is provided by a developmental study (De Villiers 
& Flusberg, 1975). In this study, children of age 2 to 4 watched displays of seven similar 
objects (e.g., toy cars) and one dissimilar object (e.g., a baby bottle). The experimenter 
pointed to an object and prompted children with affirmations (i.e., This is a…) and negations 
(i.e., This is not a…). The children’s task was to respond with the name of the object. The 
dependent variables consisted of the time taken to name the object and the error rate. Results 
showed that when the experimenter pointed to one of the seven similar objects, the children 
responded faster to the affirmation prompt than to the negation prompt. However, when the 
experimenter pointed to the dissimilar object, the children responded equally fast to the 
affirmation and negation prompts. Apparently, the processing of negations is facilitated when 
they are used to communicate unexpected or unusual information. 
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Taken together, research on negations suggests that that they are more appropriate and 
easier to comprehend in communications about expectancy inconsistent information. 
Extending these findings to the communication of stereotypes, we propose that the use of 
negations in describing other people is driven by existing stereotypic expectancies, resulting 
in the negation bias. 
The Negation Bias 
Why should the use of negations change as a function of stereotypic expectancies? We 
know from the stereotype literature that, upon perceiving (or reading about) the behavior of an 
actor, people automatically activate the mental representations associated with the person or 
the social category to which the person belongs (Devine, 1989; Fiske, 1998; Gilbert & Hixon, 
1991; Lepore & Brown, 1997; Wigboldus, Dijksterhuis & Van Knippenberg, 2003). For 
example, the category label professor activates stereotype consistent trait terms such as smart 
and inhibits stereotype inconsistent trait terms such as stupid (Dijksterhuis & Van 
Knippenberg, 1996). One result of this is that the activation of a social category should make 
the use of terms that are stereotype consistent with this category more probable in descriptions 
of category members. In a similar vein, because of the decreased accessibility of stereotype 
inconsistent terms, their use will be less likely in these descriptions. 
Taken together, this should result in an increased likelihood of negation use when the 
person’s behavior is stereotype inconsistent. To get back to our previous example, when 
describing a person who made an awkwardly dim comment, one might be inclined to use the 
term stupid. However, the prior knowledge that this person is a professor will make stereotype 
consistent terms, such as smart, temporary more accessible, and stereotype inconsistent terms, 
such as stupid, temporary less accessible. Due to these differences in accessibility, the 
description of the dim behavior of a professor is relatively likely to contain a negation (i.e., 
She is not smart). Conversely, when describing a person who made a very clever comment, 
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one might be inclined to use the term smart. Yet, the prior knowledge that this person is a 
soccer hooligan will render the concept stupid more accessible (and the term smart less 
accessible) and as a result lead to a description containing a negation (i.e., not stupid rather 
than smart).  
 Importantly, the stereotypically biased use of negations may be an important source of 
bias by which people subtly reveal and communicate their stereotypic expectancies. By 
choosing a negation instead of an affirmative antonym, people introduce stereotype consistent 
information to the discourse. To illustrate, when stating that Harry’s dim comment was not 
smart, one introduces the meaning of the negated item (i.e., smart) and the presupposition that 
Harry was expected to be smart, which is denied. Moreover, by introducing information via a 
negation, people convey a mitigated, more neutral version of the described event (see Giora, 
Fein et al., 2005). To illustrate, not smart introduces a positive concept to describe Harry’s 
dim comment, and consequently conveys a less negative impression of Harry’s behavior than 
stating that Harry’s comment was stupid. Likewise, not stupid conveys a less positive 
impression than smart, because it introduces a negative concept. Thus, when negations are 
used, a less extreme, more neutral meaning is conveyed.  
 With respect to the communicative consequences, we expect the proposed biased use 
of negations (e.g., to describe negative behavior of a professor as ‘not smart’ rather than 
‘stupid’) to go together with a stereotype confirming pattern of inferences in recipients. First, 
when negations rather than affirmations are used, we expect message recipients to develop a 
less extreme impression of the actor’s behavior (i.e., less negative in the case of ‘not smart’). 
Second, we expect recipients to infer that the communicators’ prior expectancy is opposite to 
the described behavior (i.e., he/she expected ‘smart’ behavior). Moreover, we expect 
recipients to attribute the information in messages containing a negation relatively less to 
stable dispositional factors of the actor and more to situational factors. This pattern of 
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inferences is stereotype confirming, because it maintains the stereotypic view about the 
described actor (i.e., professors are smart). 
 In summary, in the present work we aim to apply what pragmatics and linguistics teach 
us about negations to linguistic biases and stereotype maintenance. We investigated whether 
the use of negations is driven by stereotypic expectancies and whether the use of negations 
results in a stereotype confirming pattern of inferences in message recipients. We hypothesize 
that when people describe stereotype inconsistent behavior of an actor, they will be more 
likely to use negations than when they describe stereotype consistent behavior. The first three 
experiments aimed to test this hypothesis, using different methods and experimental designs. 
The fourth experiment examined the communicative consequences of the use of negations 
among recipients. We will further underpin our hypotheses regarding these communicative 
consequences in the introduction of Study 4. 
Study 1 
Study 1 was designed as an initial test of our hypothesis that the use of negations in describing 
an actor’s behavior increases when the behavior is stereotype inconsistent. Participants were 
presented a series of sentence pairs describing an actor’s behavior. Each sentence in a pair 
described the same actor and behavior and had the same structure, except that one sentence 
contained a negated adjective (e.g., not neat) and the other an affirmative antonym (e.g., 
messy). Participants indicated which sentence in each pair gave a more common description 
in their language (see also Giora, Balaban, Fein & Alkabets, 2005, Exp. 2). In half of the 
sentence pairs the behavior of the actor was stereotype inconsistent; in the other half it was 
stereotype consistent. In addition, even though our hypotheses are independent of valence, in 
our design we controlled for the factor valence of the actor’s behavior. We predicted that 
participants would show a relatively greater preference for the sentences containing a 
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negation when the behavior was stereotype inconsistent than when it was consistent, and that 
this effect would be independent of valence of the behavior. 
Method 
Participants and design 
 Thirty-one Dutch undergraduates at the VU University Amsterdam (15 women, 16 
men, mean age 19 years) participated in this, and an unrelated study, and received € 3.50 for 
their participation of about 25 minutes. Participants were presented with sentence pairs 
describing an actor’s behavior. The two sentences of each pair described the same actor and 
the same behavioral event, but one of them contained a negation and the other an affirmative 
antonym. For each pair, participants chose the sentence that felt most natural in the Dutch 
language. The sentence pairs varied in stereotype consistency and valence of the actor’s 
behavior, and we counterbalanced the position of the negation and affirmation in a pair. The 
study thus consisted of a 2 (position: negation first vs. negation second) X 2 (stereotype 
consistency: consistent vs. inconsistent) X 2 (valence: positive vs. negative) design with 
repeated measures on the last two factors. The dependent variable consisted of the number of 
times participants chose the negation alternative in the different sentence pairs. 
Procedure 
 Upon arrival to the lab participants were seated in individual cubicles behind a 
computer and told that all instructions would be presented on the computer screen. They read 
that this was a study on choice of words, and that they would be presented with sentence pairs 
of two sentences describing the same situation. We explained that the sentences were not 
meant to be ironic or funny but would simply describe people and their behavior. The words 
in the two sentences would have more or less the same meaning, and would be correct 
descriptions of the same situation, but the choice of words would be different. It was their task 
to indicate which of two sentences presented in a pair felt most natural to them. They were 
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told not to think too long about their answer and to answer spontaneously. Next, the sentence 
pairs were presented. Depending on the position condition, for half of the participants the 
negation was presented in the top box on screen and the affirmation description in the box 
below, for the other half of participants this presentation was reversed. Participants could 
indicate their answer by clicking on the box showing the sentence they preferred. After 
finishing the task, participants were debriefed, thanked, and paid.  
Sentence stimuli 
To manipulate stereotype consistency of the actor’s behavior we developed five sets of 
stimuli that were used to create the sentences. Each set consisted of two actors and two 
adjectives that were antonyms. One of the adjectives in each set was stereotype consistent 
with actor one, but stereotype inconsistent with actor two, while the second adjective was 
stereotype inconsistent with actor one, but consistent with actor two. For example, one set 
consisted of the two actors rock musician and cleaner and the two adjectives messy and neat. 
Messy was considered to be stereotype consistent with rock musician, but inconsistent with 
cleaner, whereas neat was stereotype consistent with cleaner, but inconsistent with rock 
musician. Each set allowed us to create four pairs of sentences in which one sentence 
contained a negation and the other one an affirmation, while keeping the structure and content 
constant across conditions. In each set, two sentence pairs described positive behavior and 
two negative behavior and two were stereotype inconsistent and two stereotype consistent. To 
illustrate, based on the set cleaner and rock musician and neat and messy, we created one 
sentence pair describing positive, stereotype consistent behavior: The cleaner did leave a neat 
hotel room (affirmation) / The cleaner did not leave a messy hotel room (negation); one 
sentence pair describing positive, stereotype inconsistent behavior: The rock musician did 
leave a neat hotel room (affirmation) / The rock musician did not leave a messy hotel room 
(negation); one sentence pair describing negative, stereotype consistent behavior: The rock 
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musician did leave a messy hotel room (affirmation) / The rock musician did not leave a neat 
hotel room (negation); and one sentence pair describing negative, stereotype inconsistent 
behavior: The cleaner did leave a messy hotel room (affirmation) / The cleaner did not leave a 
neat hotel room (negation).  
The other sentence sets that were used to manipulate stereotype consistency and 
valence were: The journalist did (not) describe Hitler (Ghandi) as a warlike (peaceful) leader; 
That brilliant (dull) student did (not) write a good (bad) thesis; My grandpa (little sister) 
thought he /she was (not) old (young); The woman at the funeral (wedding party) looked (did 
not look) happy (sad).1 The presentation order was such that a sentence pair from Set 1 was 
followed by a sentence pair from Set 2 until Set 5, and then starting again with a sentence pair 
from Set 1, Set 2 and so forth until all 20 sentence pairs had been presented. 
Results 
Of the 20 sentence pairs, participants were generally more likely to choose the 
affirmation alternative than the negation alternative. On average, participants chose the 
negation alternative in 26.6% of the sentence pairs (mean number of negations chosen M = 
5.32, SD = 2.21, minimum 0, maximum 9). The mean number of negations chosen in the 
different sentence pairs was submitted to a 2 (stereotype consistency: consistent vs. 
inconsistent) X 2 (valence: positive vs. negative) repeated measures analysis of variance 
(ANOVA). Preliminary analyses indicated that position did not result in any effects and 
therefore is not reported here. The analysis revealed the predicted main effect of stereotype 
consistency, F (1, 30) = 48.36, p < .01, ηp2 = .62. Participants were significantly more likely to 
choose the negation alternative in sentence pairs in which the actor’s behavior was stereotype 
inconsistent (M = 4.42 out of 10 sentence pairs, SD = 2.20) compared to sentence pairs in 
which the actor’s behavior was stereotype consistent (M = 0.90 out of 10 sentence pairs, SD = 
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1.25). We observed no main effect for valence (F < 1), nor an interaction effect (F (1, 30) = 
2.60, p = .12, ηp2 = .08). 
Discussion 
The results of Study 1 support the hypothesis that people’s preference for negations 
over affirmations increases when stereotype inconsistent behavior is communicated. 
Participants were significantly more likely to opt for a sentence formulation containing a 
negation when the behavior of the actor was stereotype inconsistent than when it was 
stereotype consistent. Thus, although people generally prefer affirmation formulations over 
negations (Carpenter & Just, 1975; Gough, 1965), in the case of descriptions of stereotype 
inconsistent behavior, participants indicated a relative preference for negations.  
The forced choice method used in Study 1 allowed us to compare preferences for two 
distinct sentence formulations (affirmation vs. negation) of otherwise identical sentences. At 
the same time, it prevented us from obtaining information about the extent to which people 
prefer negations and affirmations to describe stereotype inconsistent and consistent behavior. 
Moreover, it did not allow us to test our prediction that perceived stereotype inconsistency 
causes the relative increase in preferences for negations. We conducted Study 2 to address 
these questions. 
Study 2 
Study 2 aimed to replicate Study 1 using a different method and stimulus material and 
to circumvent the shortcomings of the forced choice task. To this end, participants read 
sentences describing an actor’s stereotype consistent and inconsistent behavior (e.g., The 
nurse shouts at the waiter). Each sentence was succeeded by two different descriptions of the 
behavior, one including a negation (e.g., She is not nice) and one containing the affirmative 
antonym (e.g., She is rude). Participants judged the applicability of each of these descriptions. 
To manipulate stereotype consistency, we varied the social category to which the actor 
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belonged (e.g., nurse, soccer hooligan). The behavior in the descriptions was either stereotype 
consistent or stereotype inconsistent with these categories.  
This method allowed us to test whether participants judge negation descriptions as 
more applicable when the behavior is stereotype inconsistent than when the behavior is 
stereotype consistent. In addition, we measured the extent to which participants perceived the 
behaviors as stereotype inconsistent, which allowed us to test whether stereotype consistency 
is predictive of the judged applicability of negation descriptions. 
Method 
Participants and design 
 Thirty-six Dutch undergraduates at the VU University Amsterdam (22 women, 14 
men, mean age 21.3 years) participated in this, and an unrelated study, and received € 2.50 for 
their participation of about 20 minutes. Participants read 24 sentences, half of which described 
an actor performing stereotype consistent behavior and half described an actor performing 
stereotype inconsistent behavior. Each sentence was followed by two descriptions: one 
negation and one affirmation. Participants judged the applicability of each description in 
describing the behavior in the sentence. The study consisted of a 2 (stereotype consistency of 
behavior: consistent vs. inconsistent) x 2 (description type: negation vs. affirmation) within 
participants design. 
 Procedure 
 Participants were seated in individual cubicles behind a computer and were told that 
all instructions would be presented on the computer screen. They read that this was a study on 
behavior descriptions, and that they would be presented with sentences describing a person’s 
behavior followed by two possible descriptions describing the behavior in the sentence. They 
were asked to indicate how applicable they found each description for the behavior in the 
sentence. Subsequently, the sentences were presented (e.g., The professor scored high on an 
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IQ test), followed by two possible descriptions in succession: a negation description (e.g., He 
is not stupid) and an affirmation description (e.g., He is smart). For each description 
participants indicated how applicable they found the description, by clicking a box on a 7-
point scale ranging from 1 = not at all applicable, to 7 = very applicable. The behavior in the 
sentences (e.g., scored high / low on an IQ test) was either stereotype consistent or 
inconsistent for the actor (e.g., professor vs. garbage man). See below and Appendix A for all 
stimuli and presentation order. After judging the descriptions, the sentences were presented 
once more and participants indicated how unexpected they found the behavior in each 
sentence on 7-point scales ranging from 1 = not at all unexpected, to 7 = very unexpected. 
Finally, participants were debriefed, thanked, and paid. 
 Stimuli 
 For this study, we developed six new sets of actors and behaviors that allowed us to 
create stereotype consistent and inconsistent sentences, while keeping the content constant 
across the different conditions (a - f, see Appendix A). Similar to Study 1, each set consisted 
of two actors (e.g., professor / garbage man) and two behaviors (e.g., scored high / low on the 
IQ test: partly based on Wigboldus, et al., 2003). One behavior was stereotype consistent for 
actor one, but stereotype inconsistent for actor two, while the second behavior was stereotype 
inconsistent for actor one, but consistent for actor two. For example, ... scored high on the IQ 
test is stereotype consistent for a professor, but inconsistent for a garbage man, whereas ... 
scored low on an IQ test is stereotype consistent for a garbage man, but inconsistent for a 
professor. Each of the six sets was associated with two relevant behavior descriptions; one 
negation and one affirmation. The traits used in the negation and affirmation descriptions 
were antonyms so that both descriptions provided semantically adequate descriptions of the 
behavior. For example, for the behavior scored high on the IQ test the associated descriptions 
were He is smart and He is not stupid; for the behavior scored low on the IQ test these were 
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He is stupid and He is not smart. The six sets of actors and behaviors, allowed us to create 24 
sentences, half of which were stereotype consistent and half were stereotype inconsistent. 
Each sentence was associated with two descriptions (one negation, one affirmation). Note that 
in this design, actors, behaviors, and the judged descriptions were exactly the same across the 
stereotype consistent and inconsistent conditions. 
 As can be seen in Appendix A, the order of the sentences was such that a random 
sentence from set (a) was followed by a random sentence from set (b), and so forth till set (f), 
and again starting with a remaining sentence from set (a). In this way the different actor and 
behavior combinations from the different sets were presented in a mixed random order. 
Results  
Applicability of behavior descriptions 
To test our hypothesis that negation descriptions were perceived as relatively more 
applicable in descriptions of stereotype inconsistent behavior compared to stereotype 
consistent behaviors, we computed the mean rated applicability for the affirmation and 
negation descriptions for both the stereotype inconsistent and consistent behaviors (Cronbach 
α’s ranged from .75 to .82). This resulted in four scores that were entered in a 2 (stereotype 
consistency of behavior: inconsistent vs. consistent) X 2 (description type: affirmation vs. 
negation) analysis of variance (ANOVA) with repeated measures on both factors. Similar to 
Study 1, we found a significant main effect of description type, F (1, 35) = 25.17, p < .01, ηp2 
= .42, indicating that affirmation descriptions (M = 5.48, SE = 0.11) were rated as more 
applicable than negation descriptions (M = 4.74, SE = 0.16). Furthermore, we observed a 
marginally significant main effect of stereotype consistency of behavior, F (1, 35) = 3.91, p < 
.056, ηp2 = .10, indicating that descriptions for stereotype consistent behaviors (M = 5.17, SE 
= 0.12) tended to be rated as somewhat more applicable than descriptions for stereotype 
inconsistent behaviors (M = 5.06, SE = 0.12).  
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More interesting, however, is the expected significant interaction between stereotype 
consistency and description type, F (1, 35) = 29.80, p < .01, ηp2 = .46. Participants rated the 
affirmation descriptions as more applicable for stereotype consistent behaviors (M = 5.70, SD 
= 0.65; e.g., the professor is smart) than for stereotype inconsistent behaviors (M = 5.27, SD = 
0.73; e.g., the professor is stupid), t (35) = 5.12, p < .01, r = .30. Consistent with our 
predictions, for negation descriptions, we found the opposite pattern; participants rated 
negation descriptions as more applicable for stereotype inconsistent behaviors (M = 4.85, SD 
= 0.89; e.g., the professor is not smart) than for stereotype consistent behaviors (M = 4.64, SD 
= 1.06; e.g., the professor is not stupid), t (35) = 2.72, p < .02, r = .11.  
Unexpectedness of behavior in sentence  
We conducted a paired t-test on the mean ratings of how unexpected the stereotype 
consistent and inconsistent sentences were. The test confirmed that participants rated 
stereotype inconsistent sentences as significantly more unexpected (M = 5.23, SD = 0.63) than 
stereotype consistent sentences (M = 2.67, SD = 0.87), t (35) = 12.29, p < .01, r = .86, 
confirming that our manipulation was successful. 
Our hypothesis stated that the more unexpected a behavior is, the more likely it will be 
described using a negation (e.g., not stupid) than an affirmative antonym (e.g., smart). To 
analyze whether this was the case, we used a method developed to estimate mediation and 
moderation effects in within-participant designs (Judd, Kenny, & McClelland, 2001). First, to 
obtain a single dependent measure, we computed a new variable indicating the relative 
applicability of negations vs. affirmations, by subtracting the affirmation applicability from 
the negation applicability. A higher score on this variable thus indicated greater applicability 
of the negation description relative to the affirmation description. We calculated this score 
separately for the stereotype inconsistent and consistent behaviors. Next, the difference in the 
relative applicability scores between conditions (relative applicability for stereotype 
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inconsistent descriptions – relative applicability for stereotype consistent descriptions) for 
each participant was regressed on two predictors: the sum of each participant’s 
unexpectedness ratings of stereotype inconsistent and consistent behaviors (unexpectedness of 
inconsistent behaviors + unexpectedness of consistent behaviors) and the difference in each 
participant’s unexpectedness ratings of inconsistent and consistent behaviors (unexpectedness 
of inconsistent behaviors – unexpectedness of consistent behaviors; see Judd et al., 2001). 
Judd et al. (2001) argued that to show that unexpectedness mediates the effect of 
stereotype consistency on the relative applicability of descriptions, two conditions must be 
met. First, there must be a significant difference between stereotype consistency conditions in 
the potential mediator, in our case unexpectedness. As reported above, this was the case. 
Second, the unexpectedness difference must predict the difference in relative applicability 
score. This was the case, β = .37, t (33) = 2.18, p = .04. According to Judd et al. (2001), if the 
sum score of unexpectedness had predicted the difference score on relative applicability of 
descriptions, this would reflect a moderation model. This was not the case, β = -.07, t < 1, p = 
.66. Furthermore, after centering the sum score of unexpectedness (by subtracting the mean) 
the same model was estimated again. The intercept in this model was not found to differ 
significantly from zero, t < 1, p = .69, which indicates that there is no residual effect of 
stereotype consistency condition over and above the mediated effect (Judd et al., 2001).   
Taken together, these analyses provide evidence for full mediation of the effect of 
stereotype consistency on the relative applicability of negation vs. affirmation descriptions by 
perceived unexpectedness (Judd et al., 2001). 
Discussion 
The findings of Study 2 again corroborate the existence of a negation bias. In line with 
the results of Study 1, negation descriptions were rated as more applicable when they 
described stereotype inconsistent behavior than when they described stereotype consistent 
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behavior. Specifically, the same behavior (e.g., shouting at the waiter) was more likely 
described with a negation (e.g., not nice) when the actor was not expected to show this 
behavior (e.g., a nurse) than when the actor was expected to show this behavior (e.g., a soccer 
hooligan).  
Moreover, mediation analysis demonstrated that it was the perceived unexpectedness 
of the behavior in a sentence that mediated the rated applicability of negation (vs. affirmation) 
descriptions. These results provide clear evidence for our notion that when stereotypic 
expectancies are violated, the use of negations in person descriptions becomes more likely. 
Nonetheless, given that the methods of Study 1 and 2 relied on sentence stimuli 
created by us, an important question that remains unanswered is whether people 
spontaneously produce the negation bias when they are free to formulate their own person 
descriptions. Study 3 aimed to increase the external validity of the findings of the first two 
studies by using spontaneous person descriptions. We expected participants to spontaneously 
use more negations in free descriptions of people showing stereotype inconsistent behavior 
than in descriptions of people showing stereotype consistent behavior.  
Study 3 
Study 3 used gender stereotypes to examine the effect of stereotypic expectations on the use 
of negations. It was tested whether people spontaneously use more negations when describing 
gender stereotype inconsistent behavior than gender stereotype consistent behavior. To 
prevent the confounding influence of semantic priming effects, we manipulated stereotype 
consistency in a non-semantic way. We combined photos of two persons (one male and one 
female) and two sports (one stereotypically male, one stereotypically female). Participants 
freely described their impression of the person who ostensibly engaged in one of the sports.  
Method 
Participants and design 
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 Sixty-five Dutch undergraduates at the VU University Amsterdam (42 women, 23 
men, M age = 21 years) participated in this, and other unrelated studies, and received € 5,- for 
their participation of about 40 minutes. They were randomly assigned to one of the conditions 
of a 2 (gender stereotype consistency: consistent vs. inconsistent) X 2 (described person: 
woman vs. man) between participants design. 
Procedure 
Participants were seated in individual cubicles and were told that all instructions 
would be presented on the computer screen. They read that in this study we were gathering 
descriptions of different sports and the people who practice them, and that they would be 
shown a photo of a specific sport and of a person who practices this sport. They were asked to 
take their time to describe their impression of the sport and the person. Depending on 
condition, the next screen showed on the left an action photo of people performing either the 
stereotypically female sport of jazz ballet or the stereotypically male sport of rugby. On the 
right, a photo of either a woman or a man was shown, who we said was someone who 
practiced this sport. In the stereotype consistent conditions the jazz ballet photo was combined 
with the photo of the woman and the rugby photo with the photo of the man. The converse 
was true for the stereotype inconsistent conditions. 
Below the pictures was a box in which participants could type their descriptions. To 
activate the stereotype, we first asked participants to describe what they found typical of the 
sport and the people who practice it. In the same box, participants subsequently were asked to 
describe their impression of the man or the woman in the photo and how they expected 
him/her to behave when practicing the sport. The dependent variable consisted of the number 
of negations used in the descriptions of the person, which was obtained by counting 
occurrences of not or no (Dutch: niet, geen) in the text describing the person. We also 
registered the time and the number of words participants used for their description.  
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After providing their description, participants answered the following questions on 7-
point scales ranging from 1 = not at all to 7 = very much. First, we asked How unexpected is it 
that this person practices this sport?, and To what extent is this person someone who typically 
practices this sport?. After reverse coding the second item, these items formed a reliable scale 
measuring unexpectedness (Cronbach’s α = .83). To check whether rugby was indeed viewed 
as a stereotypically male sport and jazz ballet as a stereotypically female sport we asked 
participants in all conditions two questions: To what extent is rugby a sport typical for men?, 
and To what extent is jazz ballet a sport typical for women? 
Results 
We conducted 2 (gender stereotype consistency: consistent, inconsistent) X 2 
(described person: woman, man) univariate analyses of variance (ANOVAs) on all dependent 
variables. 
Manipulation check 
Participants agreed with the notion that rugby is a stereotypically male sport (M = 
6.32, SD = 0.92) and jazz ballet a stereotypically female sport (M = 5.15, SD = 1.86). Both the 
mean rating for rugby and jazz ballet were significantly higher than the scale midpoint of 3.5, 
t (64) = 24.73, p < .01, r = .95, for rugby; t (64) = 7.18, p < .01, r = .67, for jazz ballet, 
respectively.  
Use of negations 
Before analyzing our main hypothesis regarding the number of negations used, we 
checked whether there were any systematic differences in writing time or length of 
descriptions between conditions. The analyses of variance did not yield effects for writing 
time (all Fs < 1.1; overall M = 5.44 minutes, SD = 2.92) or the number of words used to 
describe the person (all F’s < 1; overall M = 69 words, SD = 38).  
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We hypothesized that participants would use more negations when describing a person 
in a stereotype inconsistent situation than when describing the same person in a stereotype 
consistent situation. To test this hypothesis, we conducted an analysis of variance on the 
number of negations that were used in descriptions of the person. Consistent with our 
prediction the analysis yielded a significant main effect of stereotype consistency, F (1, 61) = 
10.77, p < .01, ηp2 = .15. Participants used more negations in descriptions of persons 
presented in a stereotype inconsistent situation (M = 1.74, SD = 1.32) than in descriptions of 
persons presented in stereotype consistent situations (M = 0.79, SD = 1.12). No main effect of 
described person (F < 1) or interaction effect (F (1, 61) = 2.81, p = .10) emerged.  
Unexpectedness of behavior 
The analysis on unexpectedness revealed a large main effect of gender stereotype 
consistency, F (1, 61) = 136.17, p < .01, ηp2 = .69, showing that the behavior of a person (man 
or woman) practicing a gender stereotype inconsistent sport (i.e., jazz ballet or rugby) was 
rated as significantly more unexpected (M = 6.10, SD = 0.82) than the behavior of a person 
practicing a gender stereotype consistent sport (M = 3.10, SD = 1.18). We observed no 
significant main effect of described person, F < 1, nor an interaction effect, F (1, 61) = 2.40, p 
= .13 in this analysis. 
In addition, we found that the number of negations used in describing the person was 
significantly correlated with these judgments of unexpectedness, r (65) = .35, p < .01. This 
finding is in line with the idea that negation use is augmented with increasing perceived 
unexpectedness of the described person’s behavior.2 
Discussion 
The findings of our third study again support our predictions regarding the negation 
bias. Participants spontaneously used more negations when the person engaged in stereotype 
inconsistent behavior than when the same person engaged in stereotype consistent behavior. 
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Importantly, replicating Study 2, the perceived unexpectedness of the behavior again was 
related to the use of negations. This affirms our suggestion that negation use reflects 
stereotype inconsistency: The more participants perceived a behavior to be stereotype 
inconsistent, the more they spontaneously used negations. Taken together, the results of our 
first three studies suggest that negations are an important source of bias by which people 
reveal stereotypic expectancies in their communications. The question whether this biased use 
of negations influences inferences made by recipients of these communications was examined 
in Study 4. 
Study 4 
 In line with other linguistic biases (see Franco & Maass, 1996; Wigboldus & Douglas, 
2007), we like to suggest that the use of negations subtly communicates stereotypic 
expectancies to recipients and consequently contributes to stereotype maintenance at an 
interpersonal level. Study 4 sought to examine three questions regarding the communicative 
consequences of the negation bias that have remained unanswered by our previous studies. 
 A first question is whether negation descriptions (e.g., Harry was not smart) 
communicate a different impression of the described person than affirmation descriptions 
(e.g., Harry was stupid). Research in psycholinguistics examined how message recipients 
process negated concepts. An ongoing debate is whether information introduced via negations 
(e.g., the concept ‘smart’ in ‘not smart’) remains accessible, or instead, is suppressed and 
replaced by an available antonym (i.e., stupid). One view is that a negation signals a speaker’s 
instruction to suppress the negated information and eliminates it from the mental 
representation (e.g., Hasson & Glucksberg, 2006; Kaup, 2001; MacDonald & Just, 1989). In 
this case, the meaning communicated by not smart will indeed be equivalent to stupid. In 
contrast, Giora and colleagues argue that the information introduced via negations is more 
likely to remain accessible than to be suppressed (Giora, 2007; Giora, Balaban et al., 2005; 
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Giora, Fein et al., 2005). Supporting their suggestions, several studies showed that rather than 
discarding the negated concept from the mental representation, a negation marker mitigates 
this information. For example, in one study (Giora, Balaban, et al., 2005, Exp. 1) the authors 
used a lexical decision task to investigate the type of knowledge that is activated from reading 
negated versus non-negated concepts. Results showed that both negated and non-negated 
concepts make the same knowledge structures more accessible. To illustrate, not sharp and 
sharp facilitate recognition of words associated with the concept sharp (i.e., sharp, piercing), 
whereas the antonym of the concept (i.e., blunt) does not facilitate recognition of the concept 
sharp. Thus, although not sharp and blunt may seem akin, they are not. That is, not does not 
deactivate the concept it negates. Sharp and not-sharp both prime the same concepts. This 
suggests that negation markers have no inhibitory effects. That is, the negated concept or 
statement remains accessible (Giora, 2007; Giora, Balaban, et al., 2005; Giora, Fein, 
Aschkenazi, & Alkabets-Zlozover, 2007).  
The ironic consequence is that, when negations are used, the meaning of the negated 
concept is introduced to the discourse, and the exact opposite of the message content is made 
more accessible in recipients. This is in line with previous research on persuasion 
demonstrating that persuasive attempts containing a negation (e.g., Drinking is not sexy) can 
lead to attitude change opposite of what was intended (i.e., make drinking seem sexy; Christie 
et al., 2001; Grant, Malaviya, & Sternthal, 2004). Similarly, recipients may remember the 
opposite of the intended meaning (i.e., John is guilty) when they heard a negation (i.e., John 
was not guilty; Mayo, Schul, & Burnstein, 2004). Thus, research suggests that negations make 
associations with the negated concept more accessible. Consequently, rather than suppressing 
the associations that a speaker denies, negations may reinforce these associations in a 
recipient.  
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Extending these suggestions to the negation bias, we predicted that negation 
descriptions communicate a more neutral impression of the described person than affirmation 
descriptions. Specifically, we hypothesized that when a positive performance of a person is 
described with a negation (e.g., not stupid), the communicated impression is more negative 
than when it is described with an affirmation (e.g., smart). That is, in this case, the negation 
makes a negative concept (e.g., stupid) temporarily more accessible. If the use of the negation 
resulted from a negative stereotypic expectancy of the speaker, as our previous studies 
suggest, this expectancy is thus reinforced in a more negative impression in recipients. 
Conversely, when a negative performance is described with a negation (e.g., not smart) 
compared to an affirmation (e.g., stupid), we expected that the communicated impression is 
more positive. This could reinforce a positive stereotypic expectancy of a speaker in 
recipients. These suggestions are in line with the notion that negations are mitigations that 
downplay both positive and negative information (Giora, Fein et al., 2005). 
 A second question is whether recipients draw inferences about a speaker’s prior 
expectancies when he or she uses a negation to describe someone’s behavior. Previous 
research has demonstrated that bias in language use can be diagnostic of the speaker’s 
expectancies (Douglas & Sutton, 2006). If the use of negations results from a speaker’s 
positive or negative prior expectancies, it seems likely that recipients use these negations to 
form impressions about the speaker. In line with the negation bias, we predicted that the use 
of negations indicate to recipients that the speaker has an expectancy that is opposite to what 
is being described. For example, when a speaker describes a target’s positive performance as 
“not bad,” recipients should infer that the speaker had a more negative prior expectancy about 
the target than when the speaker describes the performance as “good.”  
 The third question is whether negation descriptions induce differences in dispositional 
and situational attributions based on the described person’s behavior. This question follows 
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directly from effects of other linguistic biases that contribute to stereotype maintenance at an 
interpersonal level. Research on the linguistic intergroup and expectancy bias (Maass et al., 
1989; Wigboldus et al., 2000) demonstrated that stereotype inconsistent descriptions induce 
weaker dispositional inferences and stronger situational inferences by recipients than 
stereotype consistent descriptions. Specifically, the relatively concrete language use in the 
case of stereotype inconsistent messages causes recipients to infer that the behavior was an 
exception to the rule and was more likely caused by situational circumstances than by 
dispositional factors. In contrast, the more abstract formulations of stereotype consistent 
messages imply that the behavior was expected and reflects a stable underlying characteristic 
of the actor (for an overview see Maass & Arcuri, 1996; Wigboldus & Douglas, 2007).  
 Extending these findings to the negation bias, we predicted that the negation bias will 
result in a stereotype confirming pattern of situational and dispositional attributions of the 
described behavior among recipients. If a behavior is described with a negation we predicted 
that recipients infer that the behavior was unexpected and different from what the speaker 
presumed. Consequently, recipients should be less likely to attribute this particular behavior 
to stable underlying characteristics of the actor, and more likely to attribute it to temporal 
situational circumstances. Negation descriptions (e.g., he was not smart) should thus induce 
weaker dispositional and stronger situational attributions than affirmation descriptions of the 
same behavior (e.g., he was stupid).  
 Study 4 was designed to examine these three questions regarding the communicative 
consequences of the negation bias. Participants were presented with a number of written 
situations in which a speaker described the behavior of another person. For each person 
description, containing either negation or affirmation, participants were asked to rate (1) their 
impression of the described person, (2) their impression about the speaker’s prior 
expectancies, and (3) their attributions about the described behavior.    
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Method 
Participants and design 
Twenty-nine Dutch undergraduates at the VU University Amsterdam (23 women, 6 
men, mean age 20.4 years) participated in this paper-and-pencil study, and an unrelated study, 
and received € 2.50 for their participation of about 20 minutes. In separate cubicles, they 
filled out a questionnaire presenting situations in which a speaker described the behavior of a 
target person. The descriptions varied according to the conditions of a 2 (description type: 
affirmation vs. negation) X 2 (valence of described behavior: positive vs. negative) within 
participants design.  
Questionnaire 
 Participants read that we were interested in the things people infer from descriptions of 
behavior, and that they would be presented with a number of situations in which a person 
described a behavior or performance of another person. They were instructed to read the 
different descriptions carefully, and to answer the questions for each description separately. It 
was stressed that there were no wrong answers and that we were interested in their opinion. 
 Next, participants received brief written situations in which a speaker described the 
behavior of another person (target). Each behavior description was introduced by a brief 
introduction like: “A coach has just watched his athlete Peter running a race. The coach 
describes Peter…” This was followed by one of the descriptions (see Appendix B) that, 
depending on the condition, either contained an affirmation or negation, and described either 
positive or negative behavior. We introduced three different speakers describing three targets. 
Each speaker returned four times with a different behavior description of the same target. The 
speakers and targets were (1) a teacher describing the behavior of a student who had made an 
assignment, (2) a woman describing the behavior of her brother who helped her in organizing 
a celebration, and (3) a sports coach describing the performance of his athlete in a race. The 
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four behavior descriptions of these three speaker-target situations were created with simple 
variations in the formulation of an otherwise comparable sentence, such that it contained 
either affirmation or negation, and was either positive or negative. This resulted in twelve 
behavior descriptions (see Appendix B). Each behavior description was presented on a 
separate page and was followed by a number of questions measuring the dependent variables. 
The order was such that a random description from the first speaker-target situation (i.e., 
teacher-student) was always followed by a random description from the second (i.e., woman-
brother) and subsequently the third (i.e., coach-athlete), and again starting with a remaining 
description from the first speaker-target situation and so forth. In this way, the presentation 
order of the different descriptions belonging to these three speaker-target situations was 
randomly mixed.  
 Dependent variables 
 Participants answered the following questions for each behavior description. Please 
note that the items contain the words speaker and target between brackets. Depending on the 
speaker-target situation, participants either read teacher / woman / coach in the position of 
speaker, and student / brother / athlete in the position of target.  
 To measure impression we asked: How negative or positive is (speaker) about (target) 
in this specific situation? Participants answered on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 = negative 
to 7 = positive. 
 To measure inferred negative and positive prior expectancy we used two items that we 
analyzed separately: To what extent did (speaker) a priori have a negative expectancy about 
the performance of (target)? To what extent did (speaker) a priori have a positive expectancy 
about the performance of (target)? Participants answered on 7-point scales ranging from 1 = 
not at all to 7 = very much. 
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 To asses dispositional inferences we asked the following three questions: To what 
extent is this behavior due to what (target) is like as a person? (dispositional attribution). To 
what extent is this behavior due to circumstances in this specific situation? (situational 
attribution; scale: 1 = not at all to 7 = very much). To what extent is this behavior due to the 
situation or the person (scale: -3 = situation to 3 = person). These three items were combined 
into one scale (Cronbach’s α = .83), after reverse coding the second item and recoding the 
third item, such that 1 = situational attribution, 7 = dispositional attribution (see also 
Wigboldus et al., 2000). As an additional measure of dispositional inference, we assessed 
repetition likelihood (see also Wigboldus et al., 2000; Maass et al., 1989). Participants 
indicated the chance with which the target would be likely to repeat the behavior in the future 
(in percentage 1-100 %). 
Results 
 For each dependent variable we computed the mean scores across the three speaker-
target situations for the four types of behavior descriptions. These were analyzed with 2 
(description type: affirmation vs. negation) X 2 (valence of described behavior: positive vs. 
negative) ANOVAs with repeated measures on both factors.  
 Communicated impression 
 Not surprisingly, the analysis on the rated impression of the described person resulted 
in a main effect of valence of described behavior, F (1, 28) = 562.99, p < .01, ηp2 = .95. As 
can be seen in Table 1, participants inferred that the speaker was more positive about the 
target for descriptions of positive behavior (M = 5.56, SE = 0.10) than descriptions of negative 
behavior (M = 2.16, SE = 0.10). We also observed a main effect of description type, F (1, 28) 
= 15.37, p < .01, ηp2 = .35, showing that with affirmation descriptions (M = 4.08, SE = 0.05) 
participants inferred that the speaker was more positive about the target than with negation 
descriptions (M = 3.64, SE = 0.11). In line with our hypothesis, a significant interaction 
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between valence of described behavior and description type was obtained, F (1, 28) = 89.02, p 
< .01, ηp2 = .76. For descriptions of positive behavior, participants judged the speaker to be 
less positive about the target when a negation described the behavior than when an 
affirmation described the behavior. For descriptions of negative behavior, the opposite pattern 
was observed; participants judged the speaker to be more positive about the target when a 
negation described the behavior than when an affirmation described it (see Table 1). These 
findings are consistent with our suggestion that negations convey the meaning associated with 
the negated concept and consequently leave a mitigated, more neutral impression on the 
recipient.  
 Inferred prior expectancies 
 Consistent with the idea that bias in language use can be diagnostic about the 
speaker’s expectancies (Douglas & Sutton, 2006), we expected recipients to form speaker 
impressions on the basis of negation use. Specifically, we expected recipients to infer that a 
speaker had an a priori negative expectancy when he or she uses a negation rather than 
affirmation to describe a positive performance (e.g., not bad). Conversely, we expected 
recipients to infer that a speaker had an a priori positive expectancy when he or she uses a 
negation to describe a negative performance (e.g., not good). The analysis on the extent to 
which participants inferred a negative expectancy yielded a marginal main effect of valence of 
described behavior, F (1, 28) = 4.03, p < .06, ηp2 = .13. Participants tended to infer that the 
speaker was a priori somewhat more negative about the target for descriptions of positive 
behavior (M = 3.72, SE = 0.17) than for descriptions of negative behavior (M = 3.20, SE = 
0.16). We also observed a main effect of description type, F (1, 28) = 36.58, p < .01, ηp2 = .57, 
showing that participants inferred that the speaker had a more negative expectancy when 
negation descriptions were used (M = 3.85, SE = 0.13) than when affirmations were used (M 
= 3.07, SE = 0.11). Consistent with our hypothesis a significant interaction was found 
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between valence of described behavior and description type, F (1, 28) = 57.46, p < .01, ηp2 = 
.67. For descriptions of positive behavior participants inferred a stronger negative expectancy 
when negations were used than when affirmations were used. For descriptions of negative 
behavior, however, we observed the opposite; participants inferred a less negative expectancy 
when negations were used than when affirmations were used (see Table 1). 
 We observed a similar pattern of results in the analysis on the extent to which 
participants inferred a positive expectancy. A significant main effect of valence of described 
behavior emerged, F (1, 28) = 5.41, p < .05, ηp2 = .16. For descriptions of negative behavior 
participants inferred that the speaker was a priori more positive about the target (M = 4.78, SE 
= 0.15) than for descriptions of positive behavior (M = 4.25, SE = 0.15). We also observed a 
main effect of description type, F (1, 28) = 60.47, p < .01, ηp2 = .68, showing that when 
affirmation descriptions were used, participants inferred that the speaker had a more positive 
prior expectancy (M = 4.92, SE = 0.09) than when negation descriptions were used (M = 4.11, 
SE = 0.11). Again a significant interaction between valence of described behavior and 
description type was found, F (1, 28) = 81.61, p < .01, ηp2 = .75. For descriptions of positive 
behavior, participants inferred a more positive expectancy in the speaker when affirmations 
were used than when negations were used. In contrast, for descriptions of negative behavior, 
participants inferred a more positive expectancy in the speaker when negations were used than 
when affirmations were used (see Table 1). 
 Taken together, these findings are in line with our suggestion that the use of negations 
indicate to recipients that the speaker has an opposite expectancy to what is being described.  
When a speaker used negations to describe a positive performance (i.e., not bad, not stupid, 
not annoying), recipients inferred that the speaker had a more negative (and a less positive) a 
priori expectancy than when the speaker used affirmations (i.e., good, smart, sweet). 
Similarly, when a speaker used negations to describe a negative performance (i.e., not good, 
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not smart, not sweet), recipients inferred that the speaker had a more positive (and a less 
negative) a priori expectancy than when the speaker used affirmations (i.e., bad, stupid, 
annoying).  
 Dispositional inferences 
 With respect to dispositional inferences we expected recipients to draw weaker 
dispositional attributions, and stronger situational attributions, from negation descriptions than 
from affirmation descriptions. The analysis on our measure of dispositional (versus 
situational) inferences revealed a significant main effect of valence of described behavior, F 
(1, 28) = 12.53, p < .01, ηp2 = .31. Participants drew stronger dispositional inferences from 
positive descriptions of behavior (M = 4.54, SE = 0.11) than from negative descriptions (M = 
3.97, SE = 0.15). Importantly, a main effect of description type supported our hypothesis, F 
(1, 28) = 17.55, p < .01, ηp2 = .39. Participants made stronger dispositional than situational 
inferences from affirmation descriptions (M = 4.51, SE = 0.11) than from negation 
descriptions (M = 4.00, SE = 0.13). The reliable interaction between valence of described 
behavior and description type showed that this effect was stronger for descriptions of positive 
behavior than for descriptions of negative behavior, F (1, 28) = 8.90, p < .01, ηp2 = .24. For 
descriptions of positive behavior dispositional inferences were significantly lower when 
negations were used than when affirmations were used. For descriptions of negative behavior 
the difference was in the expected direction but was only marginally significant (see Table 1). 
 The analysis on our other measure of dispositional inference, the repetition likelihood, 
revealed a similar pattern of findings. A significant main effect of valence of described 
behavior emerged, F (1, 28) = 38.47, p < .01, ηp2 = .58. Participants estimated a higher 
repetition likelihood for positive descriptions of behavior (M = 63.39, SE = 2.19) than for 
negative descriptions (M = 43.43, SE = 2.59). In line with our hypothesis we again observed a 
main effect of description type, F (1, 28) = 59.71, p < .01, ηp2 = .68. Participants estimated a 
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higher repetition likelihood for affirmation descriptions (M = 60.99, SE = 1.88) than for 
negation descriptions (M = 45.82, SE = 2.17). A significant interaction showed that this effect 
was again stronger for positive than for negative descriptions of behavior, F (1, 28) = 12.54, p 
< .01, ηp2 = .24. However, on this measure we observed a significant difference between 
negation and affirmation descriptions both when describing positive and negative behavior. 
As predicted, the estimated repetition likelihood was significantly higher for affirmation 
descriptions than for negation descriptions (see Table 1).  
Discussion 
 Taken together, the results of Study 4 demonstrate that the use of negations has 
communicative consequences in that it biases the inferences recipients draw about both the 
speaker and the target of the descriptions. When negations (e.g., not bad, not stupid), as 
compared to affirmations (e.g., good, smart), were used to describe a person’s positive 
performance, recipients inferred (1) that the speaker had a more negative impression of the 
described person, (2) that the speaker had a more negative prior expectancy, (3) that the 
performance of the person was less likely caused by stable dispositional factors, and (4) that 
the person would be less likely to repeat this positive performance in the future. Conversely, 
when negations were used to describe negative performances (e.g., not good, not smart rather 
than bad, stupid), recipients inferred (1) that the speaker had a more positive impression of the 
described person, (2) had a more positive prior expectancy, and (3) that the person would be 
less likely to repeat this positive performance in the future.  
 The effects of negations on the inferences drawn were more pronounced for 
descriptions of positive than negative behavior. A possible reason for this observed 
asymmetry may be that people use negations to be polite, especially when describing a 
negative performance. That is, it is more polite to describe someone’s stupid behavior as not 
smart than as stupid, because a negation mitigates the potentially face threatening information 
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(see Giora, Fein et al., 2005). If negations (especially those on negative behavior) are indeed 
used to be polite, it is not surprising that these descriptions are perceived as less informative 
about a speaker’s expectancies and the target’s disposition, because the speaker may be hiding 
his or her true thoughts and feelings about a person.  
 Importantly, the inferences made by recipients on the basis of negation use contribute 
to the maintenance of stereotypes and expectancies at an interpersonal level. Speakers use 
relatively many negations to describe stereotype inconsistent behaviors (see Studies 1-3) and 
this use of negations, in the current study, leads recipients to make less dispositional 
attributions and stronger situational attributions on the basis of this information. In this way, 
stereotype inconsistent information remains unexpected and the stereotypical view is 
perpetuated, even despite the fact that a stereotype inconsistent behavior is being described. 
General Discussion 
To the best of our knowledge, our research is the first to explicitly illuminate the role 
of negations in the communication of stereotypic expectancies. Across four studies, we found 
consistent evidence for our prediction that the use of negations is a source of bias that reflects 
and transmits a speaker’s prior assumptions and expectancies about other people. By doing so, 
this research is the first to apply knowledge about negations from pragmatics and 
psycholinguistics (De Villiers & Flusberg, 1975; Jordan, 1998; Glenberg, Robertson, Jansen 
& Johnson-Glenberg, 1999; Wason, 1965) to the area of linguistic biases and stereotype 
maintenance (Franco & Maass, 1996; Wigboldus & Douglas, 2007). 
Using converging methods, Studies 1, 2, and 3 demonstrated that stereotypic 
expectancies are an important antecedent of the use of negations. This means that when a 
speaker’s stereotypic expectancies are violated by stereotype inconsistent behavior, the use of 
negations becomes more likely. For example, if a speaker’s stereotypic expectancy dictates 
that garbage men are stupid, but a particular garbage man violates this expectancy by showing 
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highly intelligent behavior, the speaker is likely to reveal his prior expectancy by using a 
negation like The garbage man was not stupid. In contrast, for stereotype consistent behavior 
(e.g., The garbage man was stupid; The professor was smart), the use of negations is less 
likely.  
In addition to the effects of our experimental manipulations, mediational (Study 2) and 
correlational analyses (Study 3) demonstrated that the perceived inconsistency of the 
described behavior was significantly related to the use of negations. This provided evidence 
for our notion that stereotype consistency is indeed the driving force behind the use of 
negations in a stereotype confirming way. The finding that negation use varies as a function 
of stereotypic expectancies supports the existence of a negation bias. With this, the negation 
bias is an important addition to the literature on linguistic biases. It has already been 
demonstrated that language abstraction (linguistic intergroup / expectancy bias, Maass et al., 
1989; Wigboldus et al., 2000) and explanations of inconsistent behavior (stereotypic 
explanatory bias, Sekaquaptewa et al., 2003) play an important role in the communication of 
stereotypes. Now, we can add the use of negations to the list.  
Furthermore, we demonstrated that systematic variations in the use of negations have 
important communicative consequences. Study 4 showed that when negations (e.g., not 
stupid) rather than affirmations (e.g., smart) are used to describe behavior, recipients draw 
biased inferences about the speaker and the target. They infer that the speaker mitigates the 
valence of the performance, that the speaker had a different prior expectancy, and moreover, 
that the behavior was likely caused by situational circumstances rather than the actor's 
dispositions. Again, these findings extend our knowledge on linguistic biases (Douglas & 
Sutton, 2006; Maass et al., 1989; Sekaquaptewa et al., 2003; Wigboldus et al., 2000). To 
illustrate, when a clever comment from a person belonging to a negatively stereotyped 
category is described with a negation (e.g., Harry’s comment was not stupid), this conveys a 
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less positive impression than the clever comment allows. Moreover, it subtly communicates 
that the described person is unlikely to repeat this positive behavior in the future and instead 
is more likely to provide stupid comments, thereby contributing to the maintenance of the 
existing stereotype.  
Our observation that negations result in inferences that are different from affirmations 
is in line with previous work on the processing of negated concepts. Giora and colleagues 
(Giora, 2007; Giora, et al, 2005, 2005) demonstrated that negated concepts are likely to 
remain accessible rather than being suppressed. Thereby the use of negations may ironically 
reinforce concepts and meanings in a recipient that the speaker describes as being not true. By 
extending these findings to person descriptions, our research suggests that when a speaker 
uses a negation, like He was not stupid, the speaker introduces the concept stupid to the 
discourse. Ironically, this activates associations that are opposite to the described person’s 
actual positive behavior. The fact that stereotypic expectancies are an important antecedent of 
the production of negations in person description highlights the significance of such 
inferences. Both for the speaker and the recipients, the implicit inferences and associations 
sustain stereotypic expectancies. In this way, through the use of negations a speaker’s 
stereotypic expectancy is implicitly transmitted, and consequently the stereotypic knowledge 
perpetuates interpersonally. These findings clarify, and are consistent with, research showing 
that stereotypes are difficult to disconfirm (Biernat & Ma, 2005; Rothbart & Park, 1986). 
 In addition to the immediate inferences that negation descriptions induce, negations 
also appear to have a long term effect on how the communicated information is memorized. 
Research has demonstrated that messages phrased with negations (e.g., John is not guilty) are 
represented differently in memory compared to messages phrased as affirmations (e.g., John 
is innocent). Mayo, Schul, and Burnstein (2004) argue that these differences can be explained 
by what they call a schema plus tag model. According to this model, a negated message is 
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encoded and represented as a core supposition (i.e., John is guilty) plus a negation tag (not). 
Especially when there is no readily accessible semantic opposite available during encoding, a 
sentence like John is not guilty is first interpreted within a message incongruent schema (e.g., 
guilt concept) before the negation marker is attached. This can lead to a dissociation of the 
negation marker and the negated concept at a later time. As a result, recipients may remember 
the opposite of the intended meaning (i.e., John is guilty) when they have in fact heard that 
John was not guilty. This effect would not occur when the same message is phrased as an 
affirmation (e.g., John is innocent). These findings suggest that thinking about something that 
was not true can lead to a false memory that it was true (see also Fiedler, Walther, 
Armbruster, Fay, & Naumann, 1996). Translated to the negation bias, this means that when 
stereotype disconfirming information is communicated with negations, it may end up in 
memory as stereotype confirming. 
In a similar vein, people’s judgments are influenced by messages they are told are not 
true. For example, research on incriminating innuendo delivered by media sources (Wegner, 
Wenzlaff, Kerker, & Beattie, 1981) shows that when people read a newspaper headline such 
as Bob Talbert is not linked with mafia, they develop more unfavorable impressions of Bob 
Talbert compared to control headlines (e.g., Bob Talbert arrives in city). This suggests that 
negations are a type of innuendo that introduces a presupposition about the target. 
Presumably, recipients infer that the introduced information (i.e., linked to mafia) must be 
relevant and plausible. After all, why should one deny something unless this was in fact a 
possibility? The denial of criminality then (e.g., P is not a criminal) may itself prove 
incriminating (Wegner, et al., 1981; Wegner, Coulton & Wenzlaff, 1985; for related evidence 
see Christie et al. 2001; Gilbert, Tafarodi & Malone, 1993; Gilbert, Krull & Malone, 1990; 
Grant, Malaviya, Sternthal, 2004; Hasson & Glucksberg, 2006; Kaup, Ludtke & Zwaan, 
2006; Paradis &Willners, 2006). These findings demonstrate the consequences of using 
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negations, rather than affirmations, in person description, and highlight the importance of the 
negation bias. 
The current results are not only consistent with previous findings, they also extend 
them in an important way. Our work demonstrates that negation descriptions result from the 
prior stereotypic expectancies of a speaker, and induce inferences about unexpectedness of the 
described behavior. In other words, stereotypic expectancies elicit the use of negation 
descriptions, and these negation descriptions in turn induce stereotypic inferences in 
recipients. Research on how people establish common ground suggests that this use of 
negations is highly functional. People are more likely to talk about stereotypes and cultural 
knowledge that they think they share with other people even when counter-stereotypical 
information is available (Clark & Kashima, 2007; Fast, Heath, & Wu, 2009). This preference 
for the communication of stereotypes helps people to maintain and facilitate relationships and 
to feel socially connected (Clark & Kashima, 2007), and it facilitates the distribution of 
information about cultural phenomena (Fast et al., 2009). As such, negations are an important 
functional linguistic mean by which stereotypes are interpersonally shared and maintained 
(Clark & Kashima, 2007; Fast et al., 2009; Maas, 1999). At the same time, however, a biased 
use of negations may contribute to the distribution of negative and harmful stereotypes that 
promote prejudice and discrimination. Based on the current findings, we advise people that 
want to, or professionally have to avoid biased language use, simply to refrain from using 
negations when describing the behavior of others. This simple precaution may, at least to 
some extent, prevent the unwanted transmission of stereotypes. 
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Tables 
     
Table 1. 
Mean (and SD) recipient inferences as a function of Valence of described behavior (positive, 
negative) and Description type (affirmation, negation) in Study 4 
 Valence of described behavior 
 positive negative 
Recipient 
inferences  
affirmation 
(e.g., good) 
negation  
(e.g., not bad)
affirmation 
(e.g., bad) 
negation  
(e.g., not good)
Impression described person 6.33 (0.64) a 4.78 (0.79) b 1.82 (0.48) c 2.49 (0.78) d 
Negative prior expectancy 2.68 (0.99) a 4.77 (1.19) c 3.46 (1.10) b 2.93 (0.95) a 
Positive prior expectancy 5.25 (0.75) a 3.24 (1.11) b 4.59 (0.85) c 4.98 (0.87) a 
Dispositional inference 4.93 (0.83) a 4.16 (0.67) b 4.09 (0.80) b 3.85 (0.91) b1  
Repetition likelihood (%) 74.77 (13.99) a 52.01 (13.40) b 47.22 (17.61) b 39.63 (15.06) c 
Note. For impression higher numbers indicate a more positive impression. For the other recipient 
inferences higher numbers indicate higher values. Cell means in rows with different subscript (a, b) 
are significantly different at p < .05; b1 = marginally different from b in row at p < .08. 
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Appendix A 
Stimuli used in Study 2. 
 Actor  Behavior Relevant descriptions 
a The man attending the birthday party 
(1) 
The man attending the funeral (2) 
laughed loudly (1)a he is not sad 
he is happy 
cried loudly (2)b he is not happy 
he is sad 
b The professor (1) 
The garbage man (2) 
scored high on the IQ 
test (1) a 
he is not stupid 
he is smart 
scored low on the IQ 
test (2) b 
he is not smart 
he is stupid 
c The soccer hooligan (1) 
The nurse (2) 
shouts at the waiter (1) b s/he is not nice 
s/he is rude 
helps the waiter clean 
up (2) a 
s/he is not rude 
s/he is nice 
d The skinhead (1) 
The girl (2) 
curses at the sales 
woman (1) b 
s/he is not sweet  
s/he is aggressive 
comforts the sales 
woman (2) a 
s/he is not aggressive 
s/he is sweet 
e The priest (1) 
The junkie (2) 
brings the found money 
to the police (1) a 
he is not dishonest  
he is reliable 
puts the found money in 
his own pocket (2) b 
he is not reliable 
he is dishonest 
f The adolescent (1) 
The cleaner (2) 
had a big mess in his 
room (1) b 
he is not neat  
he is sloppy 
had his room well 
cleared up (2) a 
he is not sloppy 
he is neat 
Note. The stereotype consistent trials consist of the following Actor-Behavior combinations: 
1-1 and 2-2, the stereotype inconsistent trials consist of: 1-2 and 2-1. 
a valence of behavior is positive. 
b valence of behavior is negative 
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Appendix B 
Behavior descriptions used in Study 4 for three speaker-target situations: 1 = teacher 
describes student, 2 = woman describes brother, 3 = coach describes athlete.  
Positive behavior, affirmation description: 
1 He did well. He made the assignment in a smart way. (Hij heeft het goed gedaan. Hij heeft de 
opdracht slim gemaakt.) 
2 He was sweet. He helped me well. (Hij was lief. Hij heeft me goed geholpen.) 
3 He was fast. He had a good race. (Hij was snel. Hij heeft goed gelopen.) 
Positive behavior, negation description: 
1 He did not do badly. He did not make the assignment in a stupid way. (Hij heeft het niet slecht 
gedaan. Hij heeft de opdracht niet dom gemaakt.) 
2 He was not annoying. He did not help me badly. (Hij was niet vervelend. Hij heeft me niet slecht 
geholpen.) 
3 He was not slow. He did not have a bad race. (Hij was niet langzaam. Hij heeft niet slecht gelopen.) 
Negative behavior, negation description: 
1 He did not do well. He did not make the assignment in a smart way. (Hij heeft het niet goed gedaan. 
Hij heeft de opdracht niet slim gemaakt.) 
2 He was not sweet. He did not help me well. (Hij was niet lief. Hij heeft me niet goed geholpen.) 
3 He was not fast. He did not have a good race. (Hij was niet snel. Hij heeft niet goed gelopen.) 
Negative behavior , affirmation description: 
1 He did it badly. He made the assignment in a stupid way. (Hij heeft het slecht gedaan. Hij heeft de 
opdracht dom gemaakt.) 
2 He was annoying. He helped me badly. (Hij was vervelend. Hij heeft me slecht geholpen.) 
3 He was slow. He had a bad race. (Hij was langzaam. Hij heeft slecht gelopen.) 
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Footnotes. 
1. Strictly speaking, not all sentence stimuli of Study 1 were based on stereotypic 
expectancies (i.e., expectancies about social groups). That is, some also contained general 
expectancies about particular people and situations. We expected the same effects for these 
different types of expectancies. For reasons of clarity, however, we use the term stereotypic 
expectancies throughout the manuscript. In the subsequent studies only stereotypic 
expectancies were used. 
2.  Due to multicollinearity we did not establish all conditions for mediation (Baron & 
Kenny, 1986). That is, stereotype consistency condition and the potential mediator 
unexpectedness were so strongly related (β = .83) that there remained too little unique 
variance in the mediator to explain negation use when both predictors were in the equation. 
 
